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I.

VENEZUELA REVISITED
HISTORY OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN VENEZUELA

A brief history of foreign investment in Venezuela is necessary
to understand recent changes in Venezuelan foreign investment
policy. The development of selected industrial sectors, including
principally petroleum and mining, but also agriculture, electric
power, manufacturing, banking, and insurance, has played a significant role in shaping Venezuelan foreign investment policy.
The laws, policies, and their application can then be reviewed in
practical terms to provide the practitioner with an understanding
of the stated objectives of the host government within the context
of Third World movements toward greater control over economic
activities.
A. Petroleum
The petroleum industry has been the cornerstone of Venezuela's economy for fifty years. It has been the principal source of
Government revenues and foreign exchange receipts, and it has
provided the stimulus for extensive industrial and social change.
In 1979 the petroleum industry accounted for twenty-two percent
of the Gross Domestic Product, sixty-nine percent of total Government revenues, and ninty-six percent of the total value of exports.' The petroleum sector will continue to provide most domestic income, even after Government projects begin operating at
full capacity sometime in the late 1980s, as projected by the Government's Sixth National Development Plan (1981-1985)(VI
NDP).2 Venezuelan oil has traditionally been drawn from three
major petroliferous zones: the Lake Maracaibo region,3 near Venezuela's northwestern border with Colombia; the Orinoco River
Basin in the eastern region; and the Apure-Barinas Basin in the
southwest. Proven national reserves in these three fields
amounted to nineteen billion barrels in 1981, approximately fiftyfive percent of which consisted of extremely heavy-gravity
crudes.4 Geologists have estimated that up to forty-eight billion
1.

BUSINESS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, INVESTING, LICENSING

& TRADING

(1980).
2. Address by Guillermo Rodriguez Eraso, president of Lagoven, S.A., before
the Venezuela-American Association of New York, in New York City (Jan. 18,
1981) [hereinafter cited as Rodriguez Eraso].
3. This region accounts for 75% of Venezuela's oil output.
4. Rodriguez Eraso, supranote 2. If the current rate of consumption remains
constant, Venezuela's proven reserves will last twenty years. Address by FrankCONDITIONS ABROAD: VENEZUELA 2
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barrels more can be added to proven reserves without considering
the heavy-gravity Orinoco (tar) Belt.5 Recent surveys of the Orinoco River Basin reveal that the Belt may hold as much as three
trillion barrels of heavy viscous oil-a quantity unmatched anywhere in the world.6 The recovery factor in the tar Belt could exceed an economically viable thirty percent with the use of newly
proven technology. Technology is also available to upgrade the
eight degree API gravity heavy oil to an attractive twenty-six to
twenty-eight degree medium-gravity oil by extracting coke, vanadium, and sulphur impurities. Future production from the Ori-

noco Belt is estimated at 125,000 barrels per day (b.p.d.) by 1988
and one million b.p.d. by the year 2000.7 Conservative estimates

reveal that this will require an investment of twenty million dollars in addition to ten billion dollars in supporting infrastructure.8 Including inflation, this estimate could easily require a fifty
billion dollar investment by the year 2000.
In spite of the nation's history as a leading oil producer, Venezuela's oil potential remains largely untapped. Although the Gulf
of Venezuela has never been drilled, a recent seismic survey revealed the presence of extremely promising reserves, 9 which may
have precipitated border disputes with Colombia. The continental
shelf along the Caribbean coast and the Delta Amacuro area on
the Altantic coast south of Trinidad are also thought by many
geologists to contain large amounts of oil.
Venezuelan oil was first discovered in 1914, but World War I
delayed exploration and drilling efforts. Commercial petroleum
production begain in 1922 when a well in the State of Zulia blew
out of control and produced 900,000 barrels of petroleum in a little more than a week. Traditionally, there were few restrictions
on foreign investment in the petroleum sector. Initial concessions
to United States companies were quite generous, as were subsequent concessions to English and Dutch companies. The Venezuelan Government was determined to increase domestic production of oil through a policy of desarrollo hacia afuera (an
lin Hoet-Linares before the Center for World Peace Through Law, in Sro Paulo,
Brazil (Aug. 16, 1981).
5. Rodriquez Eraso, supra note 2.
6. Id. See also FOREIGN AREA STUDIES OF THE
HANDBOOK FOR VENEZUELA, 146 (1977)[hereinafter

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY, AREA

cited as AREA

HANDBOOK].

7. Amador, An Injection of Optimism, Bus. VENEZUELA, Mar.-Apr. 1980.

8. Id.
9. See Rodriguez Eraso, supra note 2.
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outward-oriented development path) 10 and believed that this was
facilitated by increasing the number of oil concessions to foreign
companies.11 In the late 1930s the Government attempted to exert greater control over the original concessions. A more restrictive foreign investment policy gradually developed over the next
forty years, culminating in the enactment of the 1976 Petroleum
Nationalization Bill. The foreign companies were in no position to
resist; the advent of World War Il and the example of the Mexican petroleum nationalization in 1938 made Venezuela's petroleum vital to the United States and its allies. In 1943 a new hydrocarbons law was enacted which established the principle of
reversion of concessions to the state within forty years and increased the Government's royalties from eleven to seventeen percent.12 In 1948 Venezuela's share was increased to fifty percent,
and in 1958, to sixty percent. Angered by President Eisenhower's
oil import quota system of 1959, Venezuela began to assert more
active control over the petroleum industry. A state-owned petroleum company, Corporaci6n Venezolana de Petroleo (CVP) was
formed. That year also marked Venezuela's vital participation in
the formation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 13

In 1970 a law was enacted authorizing Venezuela to unilaterally
determine oil export prices. A new Reversions Law was enacted in
1971, calling for the return of all existing concessions to Venezuela after their expiration dates.' 4 Finally, upon taking office in
1974, President Perez announced his plan to nationalize the oil
industry. On January 1, 1976, Venezuela's Petroleum Nationaliza-

10.

See Radway, The Next Decade in Latin America: Anticipating the Fu-

ture from the Past, 13 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 3, 6 (1981).
11. See generally Rossi-Guerrero, The Transition from Private to Public
Control in the Venezuelan Petroleum Industry, 9 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 475
(1976); CONTEMPORARY VENEZUELA AND ITS ROLE IN INTERNATIONAL APFAiRS (R.
Bond ed. 1977)[hereinafter cited as CONTEMPORARY VENEZUELA].
12. Law of Hyrdrocarbons of Mar. 13, 1943 and its Regulations of Aug. 1943.
13. Law of May 26, 1961 (approving the Agreement forming the Organization
of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)); Decree 260 of Apr. 19, 1960 (creating CVP), designated by Organic Law Reserving to the State the Industry and
Commerce of Hydrocarbons, Aug. 29, 1975, art. 6, at 1493-94, translated in 14

1492 (1975). See generally Faud, Venezuela's Role in
OPEC: Past,Present and Future, in CONTEMPORARY VENEZUELA, supra note 11.

INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS

14. Hydrocarbons Reversion Law (concerning property subject to reversion
in hydrocarbon concessions), GACETA OFicuL No. 29,571, July 30, 1971.
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tion Bill went into effect. 15 The Nationalization Bill created a petroleum holding company, Petroleos de Venezuela, S.A. (now
PDVSA, formerly called PETROVEN), to plan, coordinate, and
supervise the industry.16 The Petroleum Nationalization Bill permits Venezuela to sign agreements and contracts with private
companies for technical assistance. 17 Major former concessionaires and other specialized firms continue to supply PDVSA with
necessary technical support through such service contracts. When
the Nationalization Bill went into effect, PDVSA maintained
fourteen affiliates. PDVSA currently has only four integrated operating affiliates: Lagoven, Maraven, Meneven and Corpoven.
B. Mining
1. Iron Ore
Although foreign investment in the mining sector has never
matched that of the petroleum sector in Venezuela, two major
United States corporations were active in the exploitation of iron
ore before the January 1, 1975 nationalization of iron ore concessions."8 Subsidiaries of U.S. Steel Corporation (the Orinoco Mining Company) and Bethlehem Steel (the Iron Mines Company)
extracted iron ore from two large mines located in the Guyana
Highlands. When the Perez Government nationalized the mines

in 1975, the two United States companies entered into iron ore
supply contracts with the Government. These companies also executed technical assistance agreements for the maintenance,
purchasing, and engineering of the industry. The Ministry of Energy and Mines (formerly Mines and Hydrocarbons) is presently
responsible for its management and administration. Output of
iron ore was estimated at 17.5 metric tons in 1976,19 but aluminum had displaced iron ore as the nation's second most important
export by 1980.
15. Organic Law, supra note 13. See also Radway, Venezuela: Certain Legal
Considerations for Doing Business, 8 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 289, 293-95
(1976).
16. Organic Law, supra note 13.

17. Id. art. 5.
18. Decree of President Carlos Andres Perez, announcing the nationalization
of Venezuelan iron ore concessions, published in VENEZUELA TODAY, Sept. 1975,
at 3. See also Radway, supra note 15, at 293-95.
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, FOREIGN ECONOMIC TRENDS AND THEIR ImPLICATIONS FOR THE UNrrED STATES: VENEZUELA, No. 77-147 (Nov. 1977).
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2.

Bauxite

There has historically been very little foreign investment in
bauxite mines. However, the development of the industrial complex of Ciudad Guyana, in a region largely endowed with minerals, has made Venezuela a substantial aluminum producer.
Through its regional corporation (Corporacion Venezolana de
Guyana (CVG)) and the technical assistance of the Reynolds
Metal Corporation, the Government has established an integrated
steel mill and an aluminum plant (VENALUM) within the Ciudad Guyana complex. 20 The Venezuelan Government expressly
encourages foreign investors to form joint ventures with state entities in this sector, but experience to date has not been
favorable.2 1 For example, the Zulia Steel Project is now forty-nine
percent foreign-owned, although it was originally slated to be
wholly state-owned. In the 1975 nationalization, Siderurgica de
Orinoco S.A. (SIDOR) became part of the CVG. CVG now manages both the iron-steel expansion and the bauxite-aluminum de-

velopment project.
3.

Other Minerals and Chemicals

Gold and diamonds are mined principally in the vicinity of Ciudad Guyana. With the exception of the colonial era, there has
been very little foreign interference with these mines. Venezuela
has been the world's eighth largest diamond producer since 1974.
In 1978 the production value of these two minerals totaled fiftyone million dollars. Coal and salt are also mined in Venezuela.
Government officials have discussed development of the country's
"immense coal reserves" in conjunction with the proposed integrated steel plant in Zulia.2 1 Although industry sources have not
been convinced that the grade of coal is suitable for steelmaking,
the estimated one million tons of coal to be produced through
1986 is destined for a Zulia coke plant and a thermoelectric power
plant.
C. Agriculture
Before the petroleum boom, Venezuela's economy was based
principally upon agriculture. There has been very little foreign in20.
21.

AREA HANDBOOK, supra note 6, at 153.
See BusINEss INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 4.

22. See U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, supra note 19, at 12.
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vestment in the agricultural sector, with the exception of United
States investment in the food processing area. Agriculture supplies approximately six percent of the Gross National Product
and employs twenty percent of the labor force. Total agricultural
production rose to a peak in 1976, but it failed to keep pace with
population growth. Food imports have subsequently become vital
to the country's food consumption. The use of imports, coupled
with urban migration has forced the Government to take a more
active role in financing agricultural projects. The Fifth National
Plan (V NPD) (1975-1980) included a goal to become self-sufficient in most food items, and the VI NDP has continued to stress
agricultural infrastructure; nonetheless, the increase in food imports is projected to continue.
D. Electric Power
Venezuela is one of the leading producers of electric power in
Latin America after Brazil, Mexico, and Argentina. The former
Canadian and American Electric Power Company was nationalized and is now known as EDELCA, and the former Canadian
International Power Company is now ENELVEN. The Guri Dam
on the Caroni River in eastern Venezuela, designed and built
largely by United States engineering companies, began generating
in 1968. A multi-billion dollar expansion of the Guri Dam,
designed primarily by Brazilian and United States engineers, has
been delayed, but it will eventually produce nine million kilowatts. Other large hydroelectric projects, several thermal plants,
and high-voltage transmission facilities have recently been
constructed.
E. Manufacturing
The manufacturing sector, which has undergone annual growth
of twelve to fifteen percent in recent years, is currently the fastest
growing sector of the Venezuelan economy. Tires, pharmaceuticals, textiles, and glass have been produced for approximately
thirty years with foreign capital. More recently, metalworking,
electrical equipment, petrochemical, chemical, and the automotive industries have been growing rapidly. Metalworking,
petrochemical, and automotive industries are presently subject to
a subregional industrial sectorial development scheme, and other
coordination is planned. Approximately sixty percent of the direct foreign investment in this sector is supplied by the United

VENEZUELA REVISITED
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States. Expansion of aluminum production has now been integrated with the development of bauxite deposits, and petrochemical and automotive plants are being added in greater numbers.
F. Banking and Insurance
Foreign banks played a prominent role in Venezuela's commercial banking system until 1970, when the Government enacted a
Bank Reform Law requiring all commercial banks to reduce foreign ownership to twenty percent and prohibiting new foreign investment in this sector.2 ' In light of existing capital markets
legislation, rules facilitating leasing and other financial market activity, foreign financial institutions have been creative in finding
ways to maintain relationships with borrowers in the public and
private sectors, and they have extended their occasionally excessive exposure in Venezuela. s In 1981 Venezuela allowed the
Banco do Brasil to open a wholly Brazilian owned branch in Caracas in exchange for the Brazilian Government's grant of a reciprocal privilege to Venezuela.
The 1965 Law regulating insurance and reinsurance companies
required a minimum of fifty-one percent domestic ownership in
all such companies.2 4 The 1975 Insurance and Reinsurance Law
limits foreign holdings in these companies to twenty percent.25
Before this law took effect, Pan-American Life Insurance, American International Underwriters Corp., AFIA World Insurance of
the United States, Confederation Life of Canada, and numerous
British, Swiss, and Argentine companies were all operating pursu22.1

Partial Reform of the General Law on Banks and other Credit Institu-

tions, GAcETA 0FIcIL EXTRA. No. 1,454, Dec. 30, 1970. Also, ANCOM Decision
24 states that "new direct foreign investment shall not be permitted in the sector of insurance, commercial banking, and other financial institutions." ANCOM
Decision 24, Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, Dec. 31, 1970, reprinted in 11 INT'L

MATERIALS 126 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Common Regime]. All references to the ANCOM Code or Decision 24 include the modifications contained
in Decisions 37, 37a, 70, 103, and 109.
23. Asheshov, Trying to Clean Up the Venezuelan Mess, INSTITUTIONAL INLEGAL

VESTOR, Apr. 1980, at 68.

24. Law of July 2, 1965 (concerning insurance and reinsurance companies)
GAcETA OFIciAL EXTRA. No. 984, July 9, 1975.
25. Decree-Law 870 of Apr. 22, 1975 (concerning insurance and reinsurance
companies) GAcETA OFIcIAL EXTRA. No. 1743, May 22, 1975. See generally
Shelp, The Proliferationof ForeignInsurance Laws: Reform or Regression?, 8
L. & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 701 (1976).
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ant to forty-nine percent foreign ownership arrangements. 6

G. Analysis of New Investment Since 1974
Annual data is not available concerning newly authorized foreign investment after the new legal regime became effective in
1974. The commencement of the new regime coincided with sharp
increases in the per-barrel price of oil. As a result, Venezuela's
annual revenues increased sharply in 1975 and 1976, and less
sharply during the next three years. In 1975 and 1976 iron ore
and petroleum industries were nationalized amid euphoric pronouncements by senior Government officials that the country possessed adequate oil reserves and did not require foreign investment. Despite publicity indicating the smooth and successful
nationalization of the basic extractive industries, many problems

remained unresolved. Lawsuits were brought for back taxes owed

to the Venezuelan Government against several major companies.
The Venezuelan Tax Court has recently entered a decision
against at least two of these companies, afid appeals are pending
before the Supreme Court of Venezuela. In addition, a major
United States truck manufacturer had entered into an agreement
with the Venezuelan Government for approval of a diesel plant to
be built in eastern Venezuela. After a visit by the King of Spain,
however, a Spanish company was designated to build the diesel
27
engine plant.

These events have not encouraged United States and other foreign investors to channel their capital into Venezuela. Through
the end of 1978 and into 1979, the Perez administration pub-

lished figures showing authorized new foreign investment in Venezuela as high as 4.2 billion dollars.28 Careful analysis, however,
and a distinction among "authorized" new foreign investment,
registered new foreign investment, and reinvestment figures indicate that new foreign investment in 1978 actually amounted to
26. Law of July 2, 1965 (concerning insurance and reinsurance companies),
GAcETA OFICIAL EXTRA. No. 984, July 9, 1975.
27. Mann, Locking Out Foreign Investment: Government Attitudes Turn
Off Foreign Capital, Bus. VENEZUELA, Jan.-Feb., 1980, at 11. See also Pate,
Anpact's Abominable Snow Job: Rigging the Figures to Justify Decision 24,
Bus. VENEZUELA, Jan.-Feb., 1980, at 15.
28. VENEZUELAN-AmERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY, UPDATE REPORT 4 (June 1979).
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approximately 45.3 million dollars. 9 1979 figures indicate eightythree million dollars in foreign investment,3 0 and 1980 figures
were up eighty-four percent over the previous year.3 1 Thus, it is
important to distinguish among Government statements concerning foreign investment, actual registered investment (as opposed
to "authorized" investment), and reinvestment figures which generally indicate that existing firms are merely trying to maintain
their current investment, but not expand.
II.

MOVEMENT TO CONTROL NATURAL RESOURCES AND ECONOMIC

Ac'rirrY
A.

Economic IntegrationMovements

In an effort to promote economic activity in Latin America,
Venezuela joined with seven other Latin American nations to
form the Latin American Free Trade Association (LAFTA) in
1960.32 The goal of LAFTA was to gradually eliminate intraregional trade barriers in order to accelerate the economic development processes of member nations. These nations hoped to
achieve a Latin American Common Market by 1985. In 1980, with
the goals of LAFTA largely unattained, a series of negotiations
culminated in a revised approach, and the Latin American Integration' Association (LAIA) replaced LAFTA.,3 Although Venezuela retained its membership, its trade relationships with the
3
group are not very significant. '

Disparities between the more developed nations of LAFTA (Argentina, Brazil, and Mexico) and the smaller nations (Colombia,
Ecuador, Peru, Chile, Venezuela, and Bolivia) led to the formation of what was once regarded as the most successful Latin

29.
30.
31.

Id.
Mann, Venezuela Woos Investors, N.Y. Times, July 15, 1980, at 1, col. 3.
VENEZUELAN-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY, OUTLINE RE-

(Apr. 1981).
32. Treaty Establishing a Free Trade Area and Instituting the Latin American Free Trade Association (Montevideo Treaty), Feb. 18, 1960, 30 U.N.
ECOSOC, Supp. 4, U.N. Doc. E/333 E/CN 12/AC. 45/13/Rev. 1 (1960), reprinted in INTER-AMERICAN INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL STUDIES, INSTRUPORT ON VENEZUELA 4

mENTS RELATING TO THE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION OF LATIN AMERICA

207 (1968).

See also Radway, supra note 15.
33. Agreement Creating the Latin American Integration Association, signed
at Acapulco, Mexico, June 27, 1980.
34. BusiNEss INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, supra note 1, at 22.
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American integration movement-the Andean Common Market
(ANCOM). ANCOM, a subregional group, was established by the
governments of Colombia, Ecuador, Chile, Peru, and Bolivia by
the Agreement of Cartagena on May 26, 1969. s3 Venezuela entered the Andean Pact by signing the Consensus of Lima on February 13, 1973 and Chile later withdrew in 1976.36 Despite Venezuela's active participation in the organizational meetings of
ANCOM, and its membership in the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), the Caldera administration hesitated in joining
the group. This hesitation was due, in part, to unresolved differences between the Venezuelan public and private sectors regarding the need for and treatment of foreign investment.3 7 In 1974
the Consensus of Lima became effective, and under the new leadership of President Perez, Venezuela issued regulations conforming to chapter HI of Decision 24, ANCOM's most'significant
provision.3

B.

United Nations Charteron Econbmic Rights and Duties of
States

A major objective of Decision 24 and the Venezuelan imple35. Treaty of Cartagena, May 26, 1969, reprintedin 8 Im'L LEGAL
ALS

MATERI-

910 (1969). The Treaty of Cartagena is an Agreement of Andean Subregional

Integration. See generally Ebb, Transfer of Foreign Technology in Latin
America: The Birth of Antitrust Law, 43 FORDHAM L. REV. 719 (1974); Furnish
& Atkin, Andean Group's Program for IndustrialDevelopment of the Metalworking Sector: Integration with Due and Deliberate SPID, 7 LAW AM. 29
(1975); Lisocki, The Andean Investment Code, 49 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 317
(1973); Perenzin, MultinationalCompanies Under the Andean Pact: A Sweetener for Foreign Investors, 7 INw'L LAW. 396 (1973); Schill, The Mexican and
Andean Investment Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 437 (1974); Schliesser, Recent Developments in Latin American Foreign
Investment Laws, 7 INT'L LAW. 357 (1973); Note, Technology Trade and the
Law: A PreliminaryExploration, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 85 (1974).

36. The Consensus of Lima is the final act of the negotiations concerning
Venezuela's entry into the Cartagena Agreement, Feb. 13, 1973, reprinted in 12
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 344 (1973). See also text accompanying note 10 supra;
note 51 infra.
37. See Radway, supra note 15, at 292.
38. ANCOM Decison 24, Common Regime of Treatment of Foreign Capital
and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, Dec. 31, 1970, reprintedin
11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 126 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Common Regime].
All references to the ANCOM Code or Decision 24 include the modifications
contained in Decisions 37, 37a, 70, 103 and 109.
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mentation of the Decision through Decrees 62 and 63 was to insure national sovereignty over each member nation's natural resources and domestic economic activities. It has been suggested
that ANCOM had an influence on the deliberations of various
United Nations committees which in 1974 culminated in the vote
by 120 member nations of the General Assembly to adopt the
Charter on Economic Rights and Duties of States. 9 In the preamble of the resolution adopting this important charter, the Assembly stressed that "the Charter shall constitute an effective instrument towards the establishment of a new system of international
economic relations based on equity, sovereign equality, and interdependence of the interests of developed and developing countries. ' 40 The fundamental purpose of the Charter was to promote
equity and cooperation among all states, irrespective of their economic and social systems. Article 2 states, inter alia, "Every State
has and shall freely exercise full permanent sovereignty, including
possession, use and disposal, over all its wealth, natural resources
and economic activities." 41 It goes on to explicitly provide the ba-

sis for the power of each state to regulate and control foreign investment within its borders, to regulate and supervise the activities of transnational corporations, and to nationalize, expropriate,
or transfer ownership of foreign property within its borders."2
C. Nationalization of Hydrocarbons and Mining Properties
Encouraged by the continuing United Nations debate over national sovereignty over national resources, and by populist rhetoric from Mexican President Luis Echeverria Alvarez (and previously from former Chilean President Salvador Allende Gossens),
President Perez announced in 1975 Venezuela's nationalization of
its hydrocarbon and mining properties. 43 Because of a forty-year
gradual nationalization policy in the petroleum sector, the public
transfer of ownership appeared to occur smoothly as many former
foreign concessionaires remained with supply contracts and tech-

39. Bledel, The Latin American Development Process and New Legislative
Trends, 10 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 325 (1980). Charter of Economic Rights and
Duties of States, G.A. REs. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (no. 31), U.N. Doc. A/
9631 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Charter of Economic Rights].

40. Charter of Economic Rights, supra note 39, at Preamble.
41. Id. art. 2.
42. Id. art. 2(a)-(c).

43. See Organic Law, supra note 13.
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nical assistance agreements. Privately, however, it appears that
some of the financial and legal questions remain unanswered. Another interesting aspect of this nationalization was the role of the
United States Government as a mediator. There is a long-standing tradition in Venezuela and throughout Latin America that
foreign nationals are obliged, as a condition of investment, to
waive their right of sovereign "cover." The "Calvo Doctrine" has
required foreign investors to agree not to seek .intervention by
their home governments in the event of an investment dispute."
This policy is expressed in article 127 of the Venezuelan Constitution.4 5 Thus, the intervention of United States Government officials at the request of the Venezuelan Government is more evidence of the decline of the Calvo Doctrine, which has perhaps
outlived its most useful period.
Joint ventures between national companies and foreign companies 47 are generally approved, especially in service contracts to
further the exploitation of national resources. Recently, joint ven-

tures have been particularly encouraged in activities in which the
sophisticated technology involved does not yet exist within the
national Venezuelan companies.
III.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT

A.

ANCOM's Decision 24

Decision 24 was ratified by the original members of ANCOM in
December 1970, and it became effective in Venezuela on January
1, 1974. It established the framework for control of foreign capital, treatment of foreign technology, control over foreign banks,
and access to local credit for foreign and mixed companies. 48 Decision 24 was designed to promote indigenous capital formation,

A PROBLEM OF INTER-AMERI(1955).
45. Constitution, 1961, art. 127 (Venez.).
46. This includes companies with national capital of 80% or more. See Common Regime, supra note 38, art. 1.
47. This includes companies with national capital of less than 51%, or a
higher amount if that percentage is not reflected in the technical, financial, administrative and commercial management of the company. Id.
48. Mixed companies are those companies with national capital between
51% and 80%, provided that proportion is reflected in the disciplines listed in
44. See generally D.

SHEA, THE CALVO CLAUSE:

CAN AND INTERNATIONAL DIPLOMACY

article 1 of the Common Regime for Treatment of Foreign Capital and of Trade-

marks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties. See note 38 supra.
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to protect ANCOM from foreign domination, and to prevent internal competition among its member countries to attract foreign
capital and technology. 9 The principal focus of Decision 24 was
to regulate, through agencies to be established in each country,
the flow of vital new foreign capital and technology into the region and to direct its allocation without affecting the outflow of
existing capital.
Article 6 of the Code mandates the establishment of a "competent national authority" in each member nation which shall fulfill
the commitments of national participation in the technical, administrative, financial, and commercial management; control the
capitalization of local companies; authorize the "exceptional"
purchase of shares of such companies by foreigners; authorize
profit or dividend remittances abroad; approve license agreements
for the use of patents, trademarks, unpatented know-how, and
other forms of technology transfer agreements; centralize the statistical and accounting information; and control registrations connected with direct foreign investment.
In August 1976, five of the six ANCOM member nations 0 met
in Sochagota, Colombia to discuss the proposed liberalization of
Decision 24. Effective October 1976, these five member nations
agreed to certain key changes.5 1 The most important of these
changes, embodied in Decisions 10352 and 109, 5 3 increased the al-

lowable profit remittance ceilings for foreign investors from fourteen to twenty percent of the net registered capital base. Local
governments were empowered to fix an even higher rate without
49. Id.

50. At this meeting Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Peru dis-

cussed ways to keep the subregional group intact, despite Chile's demands that
the foreign investment rules be relaxed to an extent unacceptable to these five
members.
51. Chile announced its intention to withdraw from ANCOM at this time,
citing, among other reasons, a need to ease foreign investment restrictions much
further than the other countries in the group were willing to permit. In the opinion of these authors, this decision enabled Chile to initiate a remarkable period
of economic recovery and growth, while, by comparison, the ANCOM five have
lagged ever since.
52. ANCOM Decision 103, Reform to the Common Rules for Treatment of

Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses and Royalties, 20th Pe-

riod of the Ordinary Session of the Commission, Aug. 4 & Oct. 30, 1976, Lima,

Peru.
53. ANCOM Decision 109, 20th Period of the Ordinary Session of the Commission, Aug. 4 & Oct. 30, 1976, Lima, Peru.
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obtaining prior approval from the Commission in Lima. Finally,
the reinvestment ceiling was raised from five to seven percent of
registered capital. Uhder the revised rules, capital from any
ANCOM member nation is deemed national when invested anywhere in the Andean region.5 4 Such capital was previously consid-

ered to be foreign when originating outside the host country, unless the investment met strict criteria for qualification as part of
an Andean multinational company.5 5 In addition, portfolio investments by international lending institutions and public financial
institutions of any of the ANCOM member nations are now considered neutral investment (neutral capital).56
B.
1.

Venezuelan Legislation

Decrees 62 and 63 and SIEX

Venezuela began to implement its ANCOM obligations in April
1974. In April 1974, Decrees 62 and 63 were issued to enact new
Venezuelan foreign investment laws which were consistent with
ANCOM's Decision 24. Decree 62 defined the sectors of economic
activity reserved to national companies and barred new direct foreign investment in those sectors.57
Decree 63 created the Superintendency of Foreign Investment
(known by its Spanish language name of "Superintendencia de
Inversiones Extranjeras" or SIEX) within the Ministry of Development. This national agency was organized to implement the
purposes set forth in Decision 24.58 SIEX is essentially administered by technocrats who conform investment and technology
agreements to national economic development goals. These tech54. ANCOM Decision 103, supranote 52, arts. 1 (a), (b). Accord, Venezuelan
Decree 2442, GACETA OFIciAL EXTRA. No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977, art. 27.
55. ANCOM Decision 46, Andean Code on Multinational Enterprises and
the Regulations with Regard to Subregional Capital, Dec. 18, 1971, reprinted in
11 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 357 (1972).
56. Decree 567, GACETA OFIcIAL No. 31,960, Apr. 10, 1980 (implementing
ANCOM Decision 124). The three international finance institutions (IFIs)
named are the Andean Development Corporation (CAF), the Inter-American
Development Bank (BID), and the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of

the World Bank.
GACETA OFIcIAL EXTRA. No. 1,650,
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1220 (1974).

57. Decree 62,

printed in 13

Apr. 29, 1974, art. 1, re-

58. Decree 63, GACETA OFIcIAL Nos. 1,650 & 30,412, May 31, 1974, reprinted
MATERIALS 1221 (1974). For detailed discussions of sectors
reserved to national companies, see Radway supra note 15.

in 13 INT'L LEGAL
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nocrats have considerable discretion in approving new investments, agreements involving the transfer or importation of foreign technology, access to local credit for foreign investors, and
related issues pursuant to the rules and regulations. Other agencies have jurisdiction over particular sectors, such as the Ministry
of Energy and Mines (oil, gas, and petrochemicals), 59 the Superintendencies of Banks and Insurance," and the Venezuelan Tourism Corporation. 1 In reality, however, SIEX is the principal door
through which foreign investments must enter the country. 2 Venezuela's entry into ANCOM strengthened the group's position on
foreign investment. Although many foreign investors believed
that Venezuela would attempt to mitigate the rigidity of the
ANCOM Foreign Investment Code, it nonetheless enacted the
Code in a very strict form. Many believe that these rules were
applied more rigidly by the Venezuelan Government than by any
other member country.

2. Decrees 2031 and 2442 and the Law on Transformation of
Companies
In 1977, Venezuelan Decrees 20313 and 2442 replaced Decrees 62 and 63, respectively, incorporating the changes brought
by ANCOM Decisions 103 and 109 in 1976. Decree 2442 reaffirmed the rules for investment approval, profit (dividend) remittances, reinvestments, technology transfers, and access to local
credit as modified by the 1976 changes. This statute additionally
permits national companies to convert to mixed status through
capital increases, even in sectors reserved to national companies. 65
Foreign-owned firms are also permitted to comply with equity
fade-out requirements through capital increases.6 More flexibility
was thus introduced to attract new foreign investment.
All foreign investments made prior to January 1, 1974, (pre59. Decree 1225, Oct. 21, 1975. A bill is presently being drafted to expand
the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Energy and Mines.
60. Decree 2031, art. 3, para. 2, GACETA OriciA No. 31,171, Feb. 9, 1977.
61. Decree 2810, Aug. 22, 1978.
62. Address by Franklin Hoet-Linares, before the Coral Gables, Florida,
Chamber of Commerce (July 9, 1980)[hereinafter cited as Hoet-Linares].
63. Decree 2031, art. 3, para. 2, GACETA OFiciJ No. 31, 171, Feb. 9, 1977.
64. Decree 2442, GACETA OFciAL EXTRA. No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977.
65. Id. art. 52.
66. Id. art. 54.
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existing investments) had to be registered with SIEX by December 30, 1974.17 Foreign investments which entered the country after that date (new investments) require prior approval and registration. Reinvestments must also be registered with SIEX. Any
foreign investor may automatically remit up to the twenty percent dividend ceiling and automatically reinvest up to seven percent without approval. SIEX permission must be obtained by foreign companies if the increase in registered capital exceeds seven
percent while there is no limit whatsoever for reinvestment in national and mixed companies. All new industrial projects and expansions of existing ones must be registered with the Ministry of
Development in the Registry of Projects."
SIEX may approve foreign investment if the company proposing investment meets at least two of the following criteria:69
(1) the new company will incorporate or plan to incorporate in
their products a local value-added component of fifty-one percent
or more;

(2) it is committed to export products which contain a local
value-added component of thirty percent or more;
(3) it will0 generate a significant amount of national
7

employment;

(4) it will establish the facility in lesser developed regions of the
country;
(5) it will incorporate technology considered by SIEX to be
convenient for the country;
(6) it offers to transform to a mixed or national company in a
shorter period than the fifteen-year term established in Decision
24; and
(7) it pledges to invest or reinvest resources generated within
the country in portfolio investments (valores de fomento en
71
cartera).
These provisions authorize SIEX to approve new for67. Ministry of Development Resolution 730, GACETA OFiciA No. 31,930,
Feb. 25, 1980.
68. Id.

69. Decree 2442, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA. No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977.
70. No specific guideline is available to define "significant." We understand
that it is being negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
71. Decree 2442, GACETA OFIcIAL EXTRA. No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977, ch. VI, art.
36, lists the following as approved portfolio investments:
(a) Certificates of direct or indirect public debt.

(b) Mortgage bonds [ctdulas] issued by mortgage banks in the context
of the disposition of the General Law of Banks and Other Credit Institu-
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eign investment that is consistent with Venezuela's development
goals. Investments incorporating needed technology or manufacturing products currently being imported (import substitutes) are
generally afforded top priority. It has been suggested recently
that foreign companies may be permitted to establish businesses
with up to eighty-five percent of foreign capital if they agree to
transform to a mixed company after fifteen years.7 2 In practice,
however, this has not happened. National investors, who are accustomed to a minimum of twenty-five to forty percent return on
investment, would not be interested in assimilating into companies established by foreign capital with much longer term market
objectives and lower short term returns on investment. In fact,
these ownership terms will only be authorized for investments in
food processing or agriculture.
Decree 2031 reserves certain sectors of economic activity to national companies." This clarifies previous legislation regulating
domestic marketing (internal commercialization), because it extends the deadline for marketing firms to formalize their intention to divest either by increasing capital or selling existing shares
between May 1 and December 30, 1977.7" This deadline was subsequently extended to the end of 1979 for firms that requested it.
tions and to those dispositions that are included in other special laws.
(c) Financial bonds issued by finance companies [sociedades
financieras] regulated by the General Law of Banks and Other Credit
°
Institutions.
(d) Certificates of deposit [time deposits], negotiable or not, which are
issued by commercial banks, mortgage banks, finance companies, and savings and loan association entities.
(e) Mercantile obligations [bonds] issued by companies through a public
offering, in accordance with the dispositions of the Capital Markets Law,
that do not entitle the holder to participate in the technical, financial, administrative or commercial management of the company.
(f) Certificates or obligations issued by the Andean Development Corporation (CAF). SIEX, with the prior consent of the Finance Ministry, may
also authorize as portfolio investments [valores de fomento en cartera],
within the context of this Article, predetermined portfolio investments
that are not included in the items above, following a suitable study and
evaluation of their characteristics, in conformance with the law. (Translation by the authors.)
72. Bus. WEEK, Nov. 17, 1980, at 65; Financial Times, June 8, 1981, § III
(Special Supp.), at VII.
73. Decree 2031, GACETA OFiciAL No. 31,171, Feb. 9, 1977, art. 1(a)-(d). See
also Radway, supra note 15, at 295-96.
74. This, however, still does not completely clarify "internal" marketing.
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Under certain circumstances SIEX could extend the transformation period or recommend certain conditions for divestment.7 5
Pursuant to the statute, companies engaged in the manufacturing
and marketing of Venezuelan goods are considered manufacturers. They therefore need not divest provided the sale of locally
manufactured goods generates at least fifty-one percent of their
gross sales revenue, the value added locally to the products is at
least thirty percent of cost, and the marketing activity is related
to the manufacturing endeavor.78 Whether national control in
those cases requiring transformation must extend to management, in addition to capital, is negotiated on a case-by-case basis.
Decree 2031 requires enterprises engaged in trading goods to
become national. Unlike Decree 62, however, this decree does not
refer to service companies." Therefore, companies involved in
leasing operations apparently are not required to fade down or
out.7 8 Furthermore, companies of mixed status prior to January 1,

1974, do not need to nationalize. International firms, however,
will not be allowed-to trade stock of local companies, except to or
from other foreigners, and if the traded shares are registered on
the stock exchange, the sale will not need prior authorization
from SIEX. The 1977 law changed the 20-80 rule in the design,
consulting, and professional services sectors to allow SIEX to provide an exception when the foreign company is at least fifty-one
percent locally owned and contributes technology which would
promote the country's development.79

To ensure that national companies comply with ANCOM fadeout rules, in August 1975 Venezuela enacted a law governing the
transformation of foreign firms into mixed or national firms.80
Under Decree 2442, the vast majority of new companies .must be
at least fifty-one percent locally owned from the inception; otherwise, companies must agree to fade-down (transform) to a maxi75. Decree 2031, GACETA OFICiAL No. 31,171, Feb. 9, 1977, art. 2.
76. Id. art. 1, para. 3.
77. Id. art. 1(c). See also Decree 62, GACETA OFiciAL EXTRA. No. 1650, Apr.
29, 1974, art. 1(b).
78. The Superintendent of Banking has maintained this position in practice.
No decree or resolution has been passed.
79. See Decree 2031, GACETA OFIciAL No. 31,171, Feb. 9, 1977, art. 1(d). See
also Radway, supra note 15, at 296-97.
80. Law on Transformation of Foreign Companies, GACETA OFICLI No.

30,744, Aug. 21, 1975.
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mum forty-nine percent foreign equity position."' Since 1976, foreign investors may accomplish this divestment by increasing
capitalization, rather than by selling shares.8 2 The 1975 Transformation Law requires the transfer to be authorized and approved
by SIEX, which has established certain criteria for divestment 3
in order to prevent the concentration of wealth in the hands of a
few large industrial groups.

81. Companies agreeing to fade-down must do so over a fifteen-year period
as set forth in article 28 of ANCOM Decision 24. Companies that export 80% or
more of their production to third countries are exempt. Id. art. 34. All industrial
companies, with the exception of automotive firms, established prior to January
1, 1974 have the option of remaining foreign owned if they elect not to take
advantage of the ANCOM trade and tariff liberalization benefits. If they opt for
the benefits, they must sign the transformation agreement. See Decree 2442,
GAcETA OFIcIAL EXTRA. No. 21,000, Nov. 15, 1977, arts. 49, 51.
82.

'SUPERINTENDENCIA DE INVERSIONEs

EXTRANJERAS,

VENEZUELA: A GUIDE

FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND TECHNOLOGY LICENSING IN THE 1980's, 32-33 (Sept.
1980) [hereinafter cited as GUIDE].
83. See Law on Transformation of Foreign Companies, GACETA OFICIAL No.
30,744, Aug. 21, 1975, art. 4. The divestment criteria of Superintendencia de

Inversiones Extranjeras (SIEX) include the following:
(1) The distribution of shares among national investors;
(2) The right of workers of the company to participate in the transformation process, as well as the participation rights of unions or similar workers' associations, including workers' cooperatives, savings and credit trust
companies, pension or retirement funds, or professional technical associations, social protection institutes and, in general, any other similar
association;
(3) An increase in the number of new national shareholders participating;
(4) The placement of shares for sale through public offer, preferably in
accordance with the rules and capital structure requirements set forth in
the Capital Markets Law, for the corporations registered with open capital. This law established the sociedades an6nimas inscriptas de capital
abierto (SAICA) as a new legal form in an attempt to encourage broader
equity participation by Venezuelan national investors;
(5) The opportunity to offer shares on the open market (requires prior
approval of SIEX).
GUIDE, supra note 82.

Although paragraph two requires a portion of the shares to be offered to the
workers, it does not specify that these must come from the foreign investor's
participation. In practice, SIEX has permitted the offer to come generally from
the shareholders, with the workers then acquiring pro-rata interests from nationals and foreigners.
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Capital Markets: Developments Affecting Financial
Institutions

In 1973 the first Capital Markets Law8 4 was enacted to encourage the for'nation of private capital (converting savings to investment) through Venezuela's existing stock exchange."5 This
was the first major attempt to improve the national financial
structure and encourage capital formation for industrialization
and growth. This enactment provided the basis for adequate supervision of the market, protection for minority shareholders,
more accurate financial information for investors, and tax incentives to encourage companies to go public.
Following the promulgation of this Capital Markets Law in
1974, the Government established three new development institutions designed to channel medium- and long-term funds to the
private and public sectors. The Venezuelan Investment Fund is
the most important of these. It was created to invest excess oil
profits abroad until they could productively serve domestic industries. Venezuela also established the Agricultural and Industrial
Credit Funds for the disbursement of loans encouraging the ex-

pansion of the agricultural and industrial sectors.88
In 1975 three major Venezuelan events affected the domestic
capital market. First, Venezuela's chief development bank, the
Corporaci6n Venezolana de Fomento (CVF), was reorganized. It
now concentrates exclusively on industrial development rather
than on working capital loans. CVF's activities include promoting
and creating new industrial and agro-industrial enterprises, providing technical assistance, and acting as a holding company.
Most CVF loans are long term and are granted for medium-scale
basic industries and large projects. The Banco Industrial de Ven-

84. Venezuelan Capital Markets Law,

GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA. No.

1,566, Jan.

31, 1973.
85. The general public represents only a small percentage of buyers. The
main buyers of publicly traded securities are trust funds, savings funds, banking
institutions, money desks and certain investment firms. See generally Wiles,
The Venezuelan Capital Markets Law, 8 INT'L LAW. 303 (1974).

86. Loans granted under both the Agricultural Fund and the Industrial
Credit Fund are made for extended periods at concessionary rates. Medium-

sized Venezuelan and mixed companies are eligible. Another investment fund
exists, Corporaci6n de la Pequefia y Mediana Industria, which also provides concessionary financing for small anil medium-sized companies to acquire capital
goods. It is expected that all of these industrial credit organizations will be

nationalized and centralized in Banco Industrial de Venezuela.
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ezuela (BIV), CVF's subsidiary, is an important source of industrial credit. It provides short- and medium-term financing (up to
five years) for manufacturing, commerce, transport, storage, and7
other activities in the industrial, mining, and petroleum sectors.

Second, a strong commercial paper market began to develop in
Venezuela. In 1975 Sociedad Financieras Valinvenga and Union
were established to develop a primary market for securities and
commercial paper. Valirivenga has modeled the commercial paper
market after Argentina's acceptance market, while Union initiated the repurchase agreement market. Finally, a second Capital
Markets Law was enacted in 1975. The object of this legislation
was to allocate share ownership as widely as possible. The Government promoted this objective by introducing generous tax incentives encouraging firms to become public (open capital) companies or sociedades an6nimas inscriptas de capital abierto
(SAICAs). In order to qualify as SAICAs under the 1973 law,
companies were required to distribute fifty percent of their stock
among at least fifty shareholders for each one million bolivares of
paid-in capital. This requirement proved unrealistic for a nation
in which the most widely held company (Electricidad de Caracas)
has only 8,000 shareholders. As a result, not one company ever
converted to SAICA status under the old law.
The 1975 version of the Capital Markets Law maintains the
fifty percent stock distribution requirement. However, it omits a
minimum number of shareholders and the maximum size of holding companies which, by publicly distributing at least fifty percent of their shares, may become eligible for a twenty-five percent
credit on corporate income tax. This tax credit ranges as high as
fifty percent for distributions in excess of seventy-five percent of
capital. The Capital Markets Law also provides that shareholders
and bondholders of SAICAs are exempt from taxes on interest or
dividends. In addition, capital gains are exempt from tax if they
are reinvested in securities issued by SAICAs. Following the promulgation of this law, several Venezuelan banks,8 8 financiers, textile companies, and breweries opted for SAICA status. There was
87.

The policy of Banco Industrial de Venezuela (BIV) is to give priority to

ventures that save or earn foreign exchange or that use domestic raw materials,
particularly in agro-industry, textiles, construction materials, automotive components, wood and paper, and chemicals.
88. The most successful experience as SAICA is undoubtedly that of Banco

Provincial de Venezuela.
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speculation that foreign-owned firms might follow suit, but this
has not materialized. The tax incentives may encourage expansion of the capital market; however, many investors still find SAICAs unattractive because their shares are overpriced, they are
overcontrolled, and their price/earnings ratio is below average.8 9
4.

Technology Transfer and Nonfinancial Service Companies
(a) Licensing and Decree 746

Pursuant to Decree 2442, all agreements involving the transfer
of technology and licencing of valid patents and trademarks must
be registered with and approved by SIEX within thirty days after
execution in order to attain legal effect.9 0 Since Venzuelan courts
lack the authority to halt infringements and violations of indus-

trial property rights, patents and trademarks should be registered
immediately in Venezuela in order to prevent piracy. Venezuela
operates on a first-to-register basis rather than the first-to-use
system of the United States.
The legal definition of technology includes a multitude of fields
ranging from the licensing of patents to the transferring of human
knowledge and services (including training) from abroad. Under a
liberal interpretation, a conference given by a foreign speaker
could even qualify as a form of technology transfer. In practice,
however, only the transfer of human knowledge and the performance of services (e.g., engineering, design, or consulting) contracted by a company or an individual in Venezuela for private
use fall under the scope of these rulings.9 1
Royalty payments and technical assistance fees are limited by
this regime. Additional payment restrictions are imposed on majority foreign-owned subsidiaries. 2 Royalty payments between a
local subsidiary and its controlling parent company are strictly
prohibited under Decree 2442, and they do not qualify for a de89. Interview with F.J. Amador, Jr., Second Vice-President, Latin American
Marketing Unit, Chase Manhattan Bank (July 1981) [hereinafter cited as
Amador, Jr.].
90. Decree 2442,

GACETA OFIcIAL EXTRA.

No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977, art. 63.

91. Address by F. Roland Matthies, of the Venezuelan law firm Matthies &
Klahr Zighelboim, before the Council of the Americas, in New York City (June,
1980).

92. For a discussion of this restriction in a similar provision under Colombian law, see Radway, Transfer of Technology to Colombia:A Proposalto Modify Decision 24, 12 LAW AM. 321 (1980).
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duction as an expense from gross income.93 Such payments would
generally be treated as dividends for tax purposes. Royalty payments to an unrelated foreign licensor may be made by mixed
companies, national companies, and firms which have signed
transformation contracts with Venezuela.
Decision 2494 and Decree 2442" 5 list restrictive clauses which
may not be included in new contracts.96 SIEX does not authorize
the registration of technology contracts which contain any of
eighteen specific clauses that restrict the freedom of the licensee
to make a wide range of decisions.97 SIEX may add other clauses
93.

Decree 2442, GACETA OFICLL EXTRA. No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977, art. 68.

94. See Common Regime, supra note 38, arts. 20, 25.
95.

Decree 746, Technology Contract Registration, GACETA OFcIcJ

No.

30,635, Mar. 1, 1975, art. 1.
96. ANCOM Decision 24 lists two types of prohibited clauses, one pertaining
to "Importation of Technology," Common Regime, supra note 38, arts. 19, 20,
and the other to "Exploitation of Trademarks," id. art. 25. Decree 2442, GACETA
OFcMIAL EXTRA. No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977, and Decree 746, GAcETA OFIciAL No.
30,635, Mar. 1,'1975, consider both categories as transfer of technology. Article
66 of Decree 2442 authorizes SIEX to define the restrictive commercial provisions and other clauses which would be objectionable to the government.
97. The following provisons are from ANCOM Decision 24:
(1) Require the acquiring party to purchase certain raw materials equipment, materials, or personnel from a source designated by the technology supplier (exceptions for raw materials, intermediates or capital
goods supplied at market prices);
(2) Provide that the supplier has the right to establish prices for the

resale of the products manufactured from the technology or under
the trademark;
(3) Restrict the volume and structure of production;
(4) Prohibit the use of competitive technology;
(5) Establish the supplier's right to purchase some or all of the
output;
(6) Compel the purchaser to transfer to the supplier (grant back) the
rights to improvements or inventions arising from use of the
technology;
(7) Require the user to pay royalties on patents or trademarks which
are not used;
(8) Prohibit or limit exports of the products made from the technology or under the trademark, except in exceptional cases, but in no
case prohibit exports to other ANCOM countries;
(9) Provide for royalties for intangible contributions by a foreign
company to its parent or other affiliated company (nor will such payments be deductible for tax purposes);
(10) Provide for dispute settlement outside of Venezuelan courts.
Common Regime, supra note 38, arts. 20, 25.

26

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VCol. 15:1

to this list. Decree 74698 provides that SIEX has ninety days to
rule on the legality of clauses in new contracts, and if the contract
is part of a previously authorized project, authorization must be
granted in fifteen days.99
Technology transfer contracts are typically limited to five
years, and they must provide that the foreign firm will train local
personnel in the necessary procedures within that term. Subsequent to the enactment of Decree 746, which required existing
agreements to conform as of December 31, 1975, SIEX stated
that technology transfer contracts are subject to the same maximum duration. According to Decree 2442, however, SIEX may
authorize technology agreements for up to fifteen years with approval of the relevant Ministry.
(b)

SIEX and Its New Philosophy

In 1979, the new administration faced severe problems in deterThe following provisions are from Decree 746:
(11) Prohibit the manufacture or sale of products using the technology after the agreement expires;
(12) Prohibit the use of technical knowledge acquired through the
technology after the agreement expires;
(13) Prohibit the use of similar or like commercial trademarks after
the contract period;
(14) Impose the use of a predetermined quality control system on
the user;
(15) Require the user to sell part or all of the production to the
supplier;
(16) Establish royalty payments for technical assistance not
supplied;
(17) Require royalty payments when the user has purchased the
technology outright;
(18) Establish the obligation by the user to pay the taxes of the
supplier;
(19) Oblige the user to grant an irrevocable right to sell the manufactured products to the supplier;
(20) Require the user to grant the supplier rights to use any inventions or improvements arising out of the processes or products which
are the object of the contract;
(21) Other clauses with equivalent effects.
Technology Contract Registration, GACETA OncLL No. 30,635, Mar. 1, 1975, art.
1. For a more detailed discussion, see Radway, supra note 15 at 302-08.
98. See Decree 746, Technology Contract Registration, GAcETA OPicIAL No.
30,635, Mar. 1, 1975.
99. Id. art. 7.
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mining the country's official debt. Foreign investment appeared
to be a low priority. The attitude of the previous government was
that oil rich Venezuela did not need foreign capital. That attitude
continues to persist at very high executive and legislative levels
and in the private sector. Initially the local private sector did not
publicly oppose that position, and complaints by foreign groups
were ignored.
SIEX was neglected by this new administration. An official
from the Customs Agency was assigned an acting superintendent
with no experience in foreign investment or technology transfer.
He was replaced several months later by the Deputy Minister of
Finance, also an interim appointee, who clearly had too many
other significant responsibilities. More than a year after the inauguration of the Herrera Government, another acting superintendent was appointed.100 An economist, this official had some background in international trade and economics, and had
participated in economic studies of Venezuelan investment and
growth options. The new superintendent soon realized that credibility was part of the problem, and he proceeded to cultivate the
foreign investment community by filling several important vacancies on the staff and reducing the processing time for applications. He announced on several occassions that he viewed SIEX
more as an investment promotion agency than as a controller of
foreign investment. This vital message was heard around the
Western world.
(c) Technical Assistance, Technological Services, and
Engineering Services
Confusion has existed over the scope and meaning of "technology transfer" within Decision 24 and Decree 63 (later 2442). The
laws were apparently drafted to regulate specific types of companies, yet they have been applied generally. Tax consequences normally follow determination of the legal effect. While the tax consequences of ordinary license agreements for patents or
trademarks (and the royalty and technical assistance payments
therefor) were understood, several decrees and regulations complicated the problem for companies providing engineering, design,
consulting, or similar services. The 1978 Income Tax Law (discussed infra) further complicated this situation -as did a decree

100.

This was Dr. Alfredo Gonzalez Amare.
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later in 1978 granting a tax exemption for foreign services companies working for Venezuelan entities on important projects (Decree 2932), and one in March 1979 to clarify these technology
transfer definitions and the tax consequences (Decree 3106).
Decree 2932 provided an exemption from Venezuelan income
tax for profits arising from payments received for technical assistance or technological services rendered from abroad to Government enterprises. The exemption was limited to those enterprises
performing industrial activities other than mining, hydrocarbons,
or related activities, and to those companies in which the ownership of public entities is greater than eighty percent. 10 1
Decree 3106 was passed to clarify the technology transfer definitions. "Technical assistance" was defined to include the supply
of instructions, written documents, recordings, films, and other
similar material of a technical nature intended for the purposes of
the elaboration of a work project or product intended to be sold.
Technical assistance may include the furnishing of technical
knowledge or engineering services, including the supply of technical data, specifications, diagrams, plans, instructions, and the pro-

vision of basic and detail engineering and related services, such as
engineering services, project research and development, and advisory and consultant services. °2 The decree also defined the latter
three terms. "Engineering services" are defined as the execution
and supervision of the assembly, installation, and starting up of
the machinery, equipment, and production plants; the gauging,
inspection, repair, and maintenance of machines and equipment,
and the making of tests and assays, including those required for
the purposes of quality control. The term "projects' research and
development" is defined as the elaboration and execution of pilot
programs, laboratory investigation, and experiments; the exploitation services; and the technical planning and programming of production units. "Advisory and consultant services" are defined as
the carrying out of external purchases; the representation, advice,
and instructions furnished by technicians; and the rendering of
technical services for the administration and management of enterprises in any of the lines of activities or operations of the

101. Decree 2932, Nov. 7, 1978,
art. 1.

GAcETA

OFcILL No. 31,611, Nov. 10, 1978,

102. Decree 3106, Feb. 27, 1979, GACETA OFiciAL No. 31,686, Feb. 28, 1979,
art. 2.
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same. 10 3 Finally, for income tax purposes, "technological services"

are defined as the licensing, for use and exploitation, of patents or
similar industrial property rights.0 Decree 476, effective January
1, 1980,105 superceded Decrees 2932 and 3106. That law includes
approximately the same definitions and tax consequences as Decree 3106; however, its cancellation of Decree 2932 removes the
tax protection given to companies supplying foreign technical assistance or technological services to Venezuelan Government
enterprises.
5.

1978 Income Tax Law
(a) General Structure

Venezuelan taxes are among the lowest of the major Latin
American countries. Superceding the 1966 Tax Law, the new Income Tax Law took effect on July 1, 1978,106 and it attempts to

reduce tax evasion, increase the impact of incentives, stimulate
the stock market, and reduce fiscal dependence on petroleum
reserves. Venezuelan taxes include personal and corporate income
taxes, an income tax imposed on mining and hydrocarbon activities, import duties, and various stamp registration and recording
taxes. The majority of individuals and corporations are taxed at
graduated rates. Taxpayers engaged in the hydrocarbon or mining
industry and related activities, however, are subject to flat rate
taxation. Each category of tax has individual rates, credits, and
rules for determining taxable income, taxable basis, and deductions. There are three schedules (tarifas) of income taxes under
the Income Tax Law. Schedule 1 applies tax rates to the income
of individuals, schedule 2 applies to corporations other than those
engaged in hydrocarbon or mining activities, and schedule 3 applies a much higher rate to companies engaged in hydrocarbon or
mining activities.
(b) Corporate Taxation
The income of corporations which are not engaged in hydrocar103. Id.
104. Id. art. 3.

105. Decree 476 to Regulate Articles 56 and 88 of the Income Tax Law,
GACETA OFcIAL SPECIAL No. 2,531, Sept. 31, 1979, art. 13.
106. Venezuelan Income Tax Law of 1978, GACETA OFICIAL SPECIAL No.
2,227, June 23, 1978.
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bons and mining is subject to a progressive tax ranging from eighteen percent on taxable income of up to Bs. 300,000 (70,000 dollars) to fifty percent on income in excess of Bs. twenty million
(4.7 million dollars). 10 7 Under the former law, the rate extended
from fifteen percent on the first Bs. 100,000 to fifty percent on
more than Bs. twenty-eight million. Tax rates on the income of
such corporations are provided by schedule 2 in article 62 of the
108
law.
Corporations engaged in the mining and hydrocarbon industries and related activities are subject to flat sixty percent and
67.7 percent rates, respectively. 10 9 Mining companies whose gross
income is less than Bs. ten million are subject to the corporate tax
rates of schedule 2. As of July 1, 1978, income from agriculture,
livestock, fishing, and forestry activities may be tax exempt for a
ten-year period.
The taxation of branches of foreign corporations is similar to
that of local corporations under schedule 2. However, an additional twenty percent participation tax is levied on net income
remaining after payment of income tax, regardless of whether the
branch remits the full amount to the home office. This tax is in
lieu of the twenty percent tax imposed on dividends paid to nonresident shareholders of domiciled corporations. Subsequent
profit remittances are not taxed further, but foreign investors are
subject to the twenty percent ceiling under Decree 2442.110
(c)

Dividend and Reinvestment Limitations and Resolution
324 on "Limbo Money"

Funds earned on excess of the profit or dividend remittance
107. Id. art. 8.
108.

Schedule (Tarifa) 2
Income (Bs.)

0
300,000
2.5 million
5 million
20 million

- 300,000
- 2.5 million
- 5 million
- 20 million
and up

Rate (%)
18
30
35
45
50

Id. art. 62.
109. Id. arts. 9, 10.
110. Decree 2442, Nov. 15, 1977, GCETA OFicmax ExTRA. No. 2,100, ch. V,
arts. 32, 33.
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ceiling of twenty percent and the reinvestment ceiling of seven

percent are called "limbo funds." SIEX had permitted capitalization of limbo funds through the use of an account called "Reserve
for Reinvestment," but the 1978 Income Tax Law provides that
such transactions (which require board declaration of a stock dividend) now require a dividend withholding tax of twenty percent.
The result is that only eighty percent of the blocked profits could
be added to the capital base to which future dividends would be
subject. Following an earlier Colombian policy,"" the Venezuelan
Ministry of Finance issued Resolution 324 in September 1980
which allows foreign-owned companies in Venezuela to reinvest

amounts in excess of seven percent without declaring a stock dividend by using the "Reserve for Reinvestment" account. The companies must obtain SIEX authorization and establish that the
funds will be used to finance endeavors labeled as industrial exprojects and defined as development priorities in the VI
pansion
112
NDP.

(d) Taxation of Engineering, Construction, and Other Service
Companies
Although Venezuela generally taxes income only when it arises
from economic activities carried on within the country or from
Venezuelan assets, income derived from technical assistance or
technical services performed abroad but utilized in Venezuela is
also taxed. Rather than allowing specific deductions from such income, the Tax Law provides that a certain percentage of gross
income is presumed to be (net) taxable income. The 1978 Tax
Law n 8 raised to ninety percent from eighty percent the percentage of gross income from royalties, technical assistance, and engineering services presumed to be taxable as net income. Decree
476114 published definitions designed to clarify this situation. This

Decree defined the two major categories of technical assistance
and technological services, and included the following: guidelines
111.

See Radway, supra note 92, at 330 & n.30.

112. Ministry of Finance Resolution 324, GAcETA OFmiL No. 32,067, Sept.
12, 1980. See also VENEZUELAN-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE & INDUSTRY,
FLASH REPORT, 6

(Sept. 1980).

113. Venezuelan Income Tax Law of 1978, GAcETA OFICIAL SPECIAL No.
2,227, June 23, 1978, arts. 56, 57.
114. Decree 476 to Regulate Articles 56 and 88 of the Income Tax Law,
GACETA OFICIAL SPECIAL No. 2,531, Sept. 31, 1979, art. 13.
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for characterization of the net taxable income from these two activities (thirty percent of gross income for the former and fifty
percent for the latter); guidelines for allocation of each of these
two categories when the particular percentages are not specified
in the agreement (twenty-five percent to the former and seventyfive percent to the latter); guidelines for allocation of the income
to services performed inside and outside Venezuela when not
specified in the agreement (forty percent deemed Venezuelan
source and sixty percent foreign source); the characterization of
income from licenses of trademarks and similar property rights,
their deductions, and allowable
costs; and those cases where the
115
Decree is not applicable.
(e)

Withholding Taxes on Loan Interest and Technical
Services Payments

Interest paid to foreign banks and other financial lending institutions without Venezuelan branches is subject to a fifteen percent withholding tax. 1 6 Interest and. premium income on loans
held by local Venezuelan entities, however, is not subject to withholding tax and is taxed as ordinary income. Interest paid to foreign banks for loans of more than one year duration for industry,
agriculture, construction, fishing, forestry, and other priority development areas is now exempt from the fifteen percent withholding tax. 117 Interest paid to foreign nonfinancial entities is subject
to corporate tax rates and is withheld at the source. Under a companion law, however, even this interest is exempt if the loan is for
financing the acquisition of capital assets for the production of
income in the same priority areas; if it is for not less than a fiveyear term; and if it is at a concessionary rate (8.5 percent including commissions and related services). 11 8
Taxes on fees or royalties for technical assistance or technological services must be withheld at the source, on an accrual basis,
by the beneficiary of the services, and deposited or credited with
appropriate treasury accounts within a very short period thereafter." 9 When such services are rendered by other Andean Pact
115. Id. arts. 1-7.
116. DELOITTE, HASKINS
TAXATION IN VENEZUELA 25

& SELLS, INTERNATIONAL TAx

& BusiNEss

SERVICE,

(1980).

117. Decree 2736, GACETA OnIciAL No. 31,526, July 11, 1978.
118. Decree 2837, GACETA OFIcIAL No. 31,565, Sept. 5, 1978.
119. Decree 476 to Regulate Articles 56 and 88 of the Income Tax Law,
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member countries, Decision 40 of the Cartagena Agreement, concerning avoidance of double taxation among members, shall apply. 120 Withholding agents for oil or mining companies and their
affiliates must file an additional withholding statement quarterly
with the tax authorities.121 Tax exemptions are available for interest on foreign loans providing the financing, refinancing and
working capital of companies dedicated to bauxite extraction,
production of alumina or aluminum through integrated processes
involving alumina
reduction, and hot and cold aluminum
22
lamination.

6. Labor Law Structure
(a) Unions in Government and Society
Approximately one-half of Venezuela's working population is
unionized. Most of the legally recognized unions are affiliated
with the Venezuelan Workers Confederation (CTV). Labor syndicates such as the CTV are composed of unions from related sectors, and they are permitted to negotiate collective labor contracts. An employer is obliged to enter a collective contract with
the union if seventy-five percent of an employer's workers request
it. Collective contracts run from one to three years and may include everything from wages and fringe benefits to work rules and
grievance procedures.1 23 Since wages are relatively high today, the

major concern of the unions is to increase the workers' fringe benefit packages. Collective contracts have been negotiated and implemented in the petroleum, steel, paper, and tobacco industries.
(b) General Considerations and Protective Orientation
Venezuela's labor legislation stipulates that at least seventy-five
percent of all workers in an enterprise must be citizens of Venezuela. This percentage must be calculated separately for salaried
employees and wage earners. Managers and other key executives
are often excluded from the seventy-five percent requirement. A
company which is unable to meet the seventy-five percent reNo. 2,531, Sept. 31, 1979, arts. 8, 9.
120. Id. art. 12.
121. Id. art. 10.
122. Decree 3050, GACETA OFicmr No. 31,669, Feb. 5, 1979.
123. See SUPERINMTNDENCIA DE INVERSIONES EXTRANJERa, supra note 82, at
52-55.
GACETA OFIM SPEcmr
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quirement, due to the unavailability of workers with particular
technical skills, must apply for a waiver from the national Labor
Office. Labor shortages in recent years and the selective immigration policy of the present Government have facilitated the availa124
bility of these waivers.

Venezuelan unemployment in 1980 was estimated at eight percent. The recent increase in unemployment can be attributed to
worker dismissals, the slump in important economic sectors such
as construction, the abandonment and slowdown of major
projects, and the influx of lower priced labor from other Latin
American countries. Underemployment is a serious problem today, particularly in the urban areas.
(c)

Employee Fringe Benefits

In addition to providing a minimum wage, 1 5 minimum working
conditions, and health and safety requirements, Venezuelan labor
legislation provides a minimum benefit package for employees.
The Government requires employers to make the following contributions: (1) a two percent tax on annual gross payroll and other
remunerations, including housing and other fringe benefits, which
must be paid to the Instituto Nacional de Cooperacion Educativa

(INCE) to finance the technical training of workers; (2) a tax at
the rate of either seven, eight, or nine percent on salaries up to
Bs. 3,000 per month, according to the degree of risk assigned to
the industry by the Social Security Administration (IVSS)12 (In

addition to the employer's contribution to Social Security, a four
percent tax must be withheld from employees' salaries); (3) full
wage payments for nine legal holidays and all Sundays, and a
minimum vacation of fifteen paid working days per year; and (4)
a maximum distribution among the employees of ten percent of
each year's net profits, equal to at least fifteen days' pay, but no
12 7
more than two months' base salary.

124. Id.
125. The Venezuelan minimum wage has been approximately seven dollars
per day since 1980.
126. Engineering and related services are likely to be taxed at 7%, but the
construction industry is typically taxed at 9%.
127. This ensures employees a bonus in the event the employer has little or
no profit.
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(d) Difficulties in Termination
An employer is liable for a long-term service indemnity (indemnizaci6n por antigiiedad)and a severance indemnity (auxilio
de cesantia) when128it dismisses an employee, regardless of the
cause of dismissal.

After imposing wage hikes and price controls in March 1974,
the Government passed an Unjustified Dismissals Law applying
to workers employed by a firm for at least three months. 12 9 That
Law stipulates that in cases other than voluntary retirement or
resignation in which an employer would have to pay service and
severance indemnities, the employer must pay twice the standard
indemnities if an employee is unjustifiably dismissed. In order to
contest a dismissal, the employee must file an appeal with a special commission consisting of representatives from the Labor
Ministry, management, and the unions. If the commission decides
in favor of the employer, the employee receives his standard indemnity. If a decision is rendered in favor of the employee, the
employer must reinstate the worker, appeal the case, or pay the
employee double indemnification.
C. New Establishments in Venezuela
1. Forms of Business Association
The foreign investor may enter the Venezuelan market in three
practical ways: (1) by establishing a branch of the company in
Venezuela; (2) by forming a Venezuelan company, including a
joint venture; or (3) by appointing a delegate for the company.
(a) Branch of Foreign Company
A foreign company can establish a branch only in two limited
situations: the "technological branch" for one-time engineering or
construction activities for Government entities or high priority
projects, or the strict sales-service representative office. The former will be explored infra, and the latter is approved only when
128. Each generally amounts to one-half of the last month's salary for each
year of service. Thus, based on the employee's most recent salary, the employee

receives one month's salary for each year of service at the time of termination.
129. Unjustified Dismissals Law of March 1974, GAcErA OFciAL No. 30,468,
Aug. 8, 1974. The law requires that all companies file a quarterly list of employees with the Labor Bureau in their district and to inform the Bureau of all dismissals. Id.
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SIEX considers the office not to be doing business
Venezuela.13

in

(b) The Venezuelan Company and Joint Ventures
The second and most common way for a foreign investor to
enter the Venezuelan market is the formation of a Venezuelan
company, either in the familiar forms of compania an6mina
(C.A.) or sociedad an6mina (S.A.)-the equivalent of a United
States corporation. Also available are SRLs and CRLs (resembling close corporations or personal companies limited to entities
of smaller capital), partnerships, and SAICAs, as discussed earlier. The S.A. and C.A. are the forms most commonly selected by
foreign investors. Since 1974, the new company must generally be
a joint venture (i.e., mixed company) which limits the foreign
shareholder to a maximum of forty-nine percent ownership. At
that level, however, the foreign shareholder may receive royalties
of up to four percent from a licensing agreement to the joint venture company (JVC). The foreign shareholder may also receive
profits from sales to the JVC of materials, parts, chemicals, and
other items not produced in Venezuela. Minimal protection is
available under Venezuelan Commercial and Civil Codes and Corporation Law for the minority shareholder, similar to that provided by Mexico and Brazil. Their rights include the use of an
outside inspector (Comisario), the right to have certain important
items discussed at extraordinary shareholder meetings requiring a
high percentage for a quorum, and veto rights for authorization of
significant transactions affecting the character, purpose, or
financial liabilities and exposure of the JVC.
(c)

Delegates

An additional option available to foreign investors is the appointment of a delegate or representative of the foreign firm. This
representative is actually a self-employed or independent contractor who pursues the firm's business interests by soliciting customers or partners for transactions, and he maintains necessary rela-

tions with governmental authorities. Unlike the other two
options, the appointment of a delegate requires no official approval, translation, or publication of corporate and related documents, and this option can be made operational almost immedi130. See Financial Times, June 8, 1981, §

M (Special Supp.), at 22.
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ately. He needs only a work permit, which is usually granted for
one year and is renewable. One interesting feature of this option
is that the delegate may thereafter qualify as a Venezuelan for
purposes of the Foreign Investment Law,"" without losing his
home country citizenship. He may then subscribe shares without
prior approval, like any other Venezuelan citizen.
2.

SIEX Policy on Branches
(a) Representative Office

SIEX continues to approve branches of foreign companies for
limited purposes. The sales-service representative office has usually been a branch of a large international trading company, and
it requires the activities of the responsible personnel to be limited
to intermediation between the Venezuelan purchaser or user and
the foreign company. This representative office is not considered
to be actively engaged in its own business. In addition to the formal documentation requirements,3 2 a registation tax of 0.1 percent of the company's authorized capital causes many companies
to have a second-tier subsidiary domiciled as a branch. Otherwise,
branches are taxed as a corporation and pay a twenty percent
participation tax on taxable income in lieu of the tax on dividends to nonresident shareholders.
(b) The Technological Branch
Venezuela recognizes that it does not possess the technology required to accomplish its formidable development plans. Many
foreign companies are able to provide such technology without
heavy capital investment, yet most are unwilling to enter into majority joint ventures to provide services while subjecting themselves to ANCOM profit remittance limitations. A solution put
forth by SIEX is to allow companies undertaking a specific activ131.

See Decree 2442, GACETA OFIcL EXTRA. No. 2,100, Nov. 15, 1977, art.

2(b).
132. These requirements include copies of articles of incorporation, by-laws
and registration documents of the parent, certificate of good standing, relevant
sections of corporation law of state of incorporation, and power of attorney
granting general representational powers to one or more attorneys-in-fact for
customary purposes. Each of these documents must be duly consularized in the
United States by the appropriate Venezuelan Consul General and then trans-

lated into Spanish for publication in Venezuela.
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ity in Venezuela for either a Venezuelan Government entity 3 or
a local private entity in an approved priority development project
to qualify as a technology transfer arrangement, rather than as a
foreign investment. Approvals of registration as a technology
transfer agreement is generally limited to a single project and expires upon completion of that project.

3.

Procedures for Energy-Related Activities

SIEX does not regulate activities within the scope of the Ministry of Energy and Mines.13 4 The office of this Ministry which reviews applications has been referred to as "Mini-SIEX" by many
observers. The policies actually applied by Mini-SIEX have mirrored those of SIEX, but they have been applied with greater
speed and flexibility. This ministry has clear priorities, in contrast to the Finance Ministry and its treatment of problems with
the foreign debt structure.
D. Rules for Bidding and Performing Construction Contracts
Past experiences with large infrastructure and industrial
processing plant construction, and the extraordinary quantity of
such projects anticipated throughout this century, caused the
Government in 1977 to issue a decree containing "General Conditions of Contract for the Execution of Work Projects Entered into
by (any Ministry or State-owned entity)."'135 These general conditions must be incorporated into all contracts for public agencies. 36 By specific agreement, some of the provisions contained
therein may be inapplicable and other provisions ("special conditions") may be added. The usual qualifications documents must
be submitted and approved. Furthermore, a certificate issued by
the Contractor's Registry must accompany the contract docu-

133. Such Government projects include power plants, transmission facilities,
petroleum refineries (or expansions or upgrades thereon), petrochemical plants,

steelmaking or processing facilities or similar work related to the aluminum expansions, Caracas metro, hydroelectric projects, and port expansion.
134. Decree 1225, Oct. 21, 1975.
135. Decree 2189, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA. No. 2089, Sept. 28, 1977.
136. Id. art. 1. In addition to the General Conditions, relevant provisions of
the Civil Code and special statutes concerning labor, architects, engineers, arms,
and explosives are also applicable.
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ment 37 before final approval by the government entity and the
Controller General. The decree requires the contractor to appoint
a resident engineer (who shall be a member of the relevant professional society) and the Government to appoint an Inspection
Engineer, who is the equivalent of an owner's architect, to coordinate with the resident engineer to assure sound execution of the

job.138 The decree contains provisions for payment (including ad-

vance payments, posting, and revision of bonds; formilas for approvals; and payments for overruns and extras), termination for
convenience or default, obligations of both parties, guarantees
and penalties, and inspection and acceptance. In view of the extensive litigation, construction contractors should be aware of the
ten-year subsurface conditions guarantee required by the Civil
1 88.1

Code.

IV.

OUTLOOK FOR FOREIGN CAPITAL AND TECHNOLOGY

A.

National Development Plan (VI NDP)

Since 1960, Venezuela has prepared national development
plans under the direction of a special organization established for
this purpose-the Central Office of Coordination and Planning
(CORDIPLAN). The National Development Plan for the period
from 1981 to 1985 is the sixth such plan. Its principal goals are to:
(1) restructure and control public sector imports; (2) discourage
import of luxury items by the private sector; (3) encourage nontraditional exports in order to increase productivity; (4) improve
the structure of the national debt, using external financing only
for projects of proven profitability that would not further aggravate the debt service burden; (5) totally or partially refinance the
external debt; and (6) encourage domestic savings. The primary
object of this plan is to improve the "quality and conditions of
the lives of all Venezuelans, particularly those suffering from
acute poverty." The Plan also emphasizes development in the
areas of agriculture, petroleum, petrochemicals, steel, social services, education, housing, electricity, water and sewage, transportation, and communications.
137. Also to be included are the General and Special Conditions, plans, spec-

ifications, project estimate or budget correlated to the schedule, and the necessary guarantees.
138. Decree 2189, GACETA OFICiAL EXTRA. No. 2089, Sept. 28, 1977.
138.1 VENEZUELAN Civm CODE, art. 1637.
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The principal tools to implement the Plan are monetary and
fiscal policies. The flexible use of national planning and the improved management and control of the public sector's external
debt are the major elements of this effort. In addition, the Plan
emphasizes development of Venezuela's human resources through
improved education and training programs, and the development
of greater social infrastructure in the form of housing and public
services, particularly for the urban and rural poor. Complete implementation will require Venezuela to surmount two major obstacles. First, the Plan's duration exceeds the present administration's term of office. If an AD candidate 3 9 were to win the 1983

election, there is a possibility that the COPE114 0 party's program
could be substantially altered. Second, the Plan was based on a
twelve percent annual increase in the price of oil, and it was expressly assumed that oil revenues account for seventy-six percent
of Venezuela's total income during the life of the Plan. The 1981
oil price reductions and consequent revised projections would appear to jeopardize the financial strategy and the accomplishment
of the Plan's objectives.
B. Major Energy Projects in the 1980s and 1990s
In order to reach the goals set forth in the Plan, the Government is prepared to initiate new extraordinary energy projects
and complete large-scale industrial projects, begun during previous years, in the oil, aluminum, iron, steel, and hydroelectric
industries.
1.

Orinoco Oil Development

The development of Orinoco heavy crude located in eastern
Venezuela is perhaps the Government's largest and most important project. Maximization of the recovery and the upgrading of
these viscous crudes represents the main challenge in the development of the Belt. Field and laboratory experiments to determine the most suitable technologies for producing and upgrading
these heavy crudes are underway.14 1 The Venezuelan Energy Min139. Accion Democratica is the party of the late Romulo Betancourt and

Carlos Andres Perez, now out of office.
140. The COPEI party is the Social Christian Party of Luis Herrera
Campins, now in office.
141. See Rodriguez Eraso, supra note 2.
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ister has stated that "if Venezuela were to wait until 1988 to start
the Orinoco project, Venezuela would no longer be a net oil exporter.

' 14 2

Shortly after the release of this statement Venezuela

awarded the first major contract in the Orinoco Belt to a United
States contracting firm. 143 The first refining module to be built by
this firm will upgrade the quality of the oil to twenty-eight degrees API using carbon reduction techniques, and it should be in
production by 1988. Two or three more modules will probably be
added by the end of the century.
Additional projects in the Orinoco region are currently being
evaluated by PDVSA. Subsidiaries of PDVSA and numerous international firms have already established research offices and
have brought skilled technicians to Venezuela in order to evaluate
developments in this region. Meneven and Maraven are both actively pursuing projects in the Orinoco. Meneven is planning to
spend Bs. nine billion by 1988 in order to produce 75,000 barrels
per day from its wells in Anzoategui State. It will not upgrade
this oil, but the oil will be mixed with a lower gravity crude, to
produce a blend acceptable to major world refineries. Maraven
will begin drilling 200 wells in Anzoategui and Guarico States at a
cost of Bs. 950 million. It is anticipated that these wells will contain the lightest crudes in the Orinoco heavy oil Belt (approximately twenty degrees API); however, since the oil is deeper in
the ground, it will be more expensive to extract.
A three billion dollar program to modernize Venezuela's refining capacity is already well underway. The project will substantially change the existing plants in order to achieve greater flexibility in production yields and increase the output of lighter endproducts while augmenting the ability to process a higher input of
heavy crudes.144 Once these refinery projects near completion,

Venezuela will be able to process 350,000 barrels of additional
heavy crudes each day.
2. Aluminum/Bauxite
Although Venezuela's major bauxite resources were only recently discovered, the Caroni power resource has transformed
142.

LATIN AMERICAN WEEKLY REPORTS,

Apr. 3, 1981.

143. The contract was awarded to the Lummus Company, a subsidiary of
Combustion Engineering, Inc. See U.S. Company in Big Venezuela Oil Accord,
N.Y. Times, Mar. 28, 1981, at 32, col. 1-4.
144. See Rodriguez Eraso, supra note 2.
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Venezuela into a substantial aluminum producer. Caroni Aluminum (Aluminio del Caroni-ALCASA) was established in 1967 as
a joint venture between Reynolds Metals Co. and CVG. The annual capacity of this plant is expected to expand from 90,000 tons
to 124,000 tons. One-half of this quantity will be for export, since
Venezuela has been self-sufficient in aluminum production since
1970. Since the recent bauxite discoveries, there has been greater
emphasis placed on integration of the bauxite-alumina-aluminum
complex. CVG also has an eighty percent interest in VENALUM,
a joint venture project with a Japanese consortium. The
VENALUM joint venture is expected to have an annual capacity
of 280 billion tons by the end of the year. Before the close of this
decade, VENALUM anticipates the completed construction of
one of the world's largest aluminum smelters which would increase the national aluminum production capacity to 400,000
tons.

3. Iron and Steel
The Zulia steel project is a joint venture which is fifty-one percent owned by Corporacion del Zulia (Corpozulia) and forty-nine
percent foreign owned. It was projected that by 1990, five million
tons of steel would be produced by this mill. This project has
been delayed by the Herrera administration's deflation and readjustment program, and it is likely that the mill will be considerably smaller. Yet a smaller mill would be more realistic in light of
Venezuelan market factors. The Government intends to increase
significantly both public and foreign investment in the mining
sector during the next five years in an effort to increase iron ore
production to a level sufficient to meet the anticipated growth in
the country's steel-making capacity. It is likely, however, that the
Zulia steel project will be slowed down and, instead, the large coal
resources will be developed in a program called the Chemical
145
Coal-Zulia Development.

4. Hydroelectric Power
The percentage of electricity generated by hydroelectric power
will increase significantly as the Gui Dam facilities in the
Guyana region on the lower Caroni River are expanded. The Guri
Dam project has entered its second phase, which calls for the
145. See Hoet-Linares, supra note 62.
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completion of ten additional power units by the end of 1987. The
Government also expects to begin constructing two additional
Caroni River dams in 1983.
C. Projected Capital Needs
A consensus now exists among Venezuela's public and private
sectors on the need for foreign capital. This is in sharp contrast to
the division between the two sectors over this issue when Venezuela entered ANCOM in 1971. This is due in part to the large
projected capital needs of the nation as it seeks to finance its major industrial projects. Furthermore, Venezuelans are aware that
foreign capital will be needed to refinance its foreign debt
structure.
Over the next ten years Venezuela will need to finance at least
thirty billion dollars worth of oil industry projects in 1980 dollars, 146 and it will probably require an additional twenty billion
dollars for adjacent infrastructure. Financing will also be required
for the completion of the Caracas metro, housing, universities,

water and electricity projects, and steel and aluminum expansions. Although the Government will be able to finance approximately seventy-six percent of its petroleum and energy-related
projects, the principal financing for the other infrastructure
projects will probably come from abroad.
1. Existing Foreign Debt Structure: Fixed and Floating
It is estimated that Venezuela's registered foreign debt, both
direct and indirect, reached fourteen billion dollars at the end of
1980.14,7 Several Government agencies, however, took advantage of
legislation which avoided congressional approval for loans under
two years of maturity, thereby incurring an estimated seven billion dollars of additional unregistered public obligations. These
were not registered as National Public Debt,148 and this outstanding obligation is referred to in Venezuela as deuda flotante (floating debt), in order to differentiate it from longer term credits registered with the Ministry of Finance. The major portion of this
146.
147.
148.
5, 1976,
projects

See Financial Times, supra note 72.
See Amador, Jr., supra note 89.
The Public Credit Law of 1976, GACETA OFICIAL EXTRA. No. 1,894, Aug.
authorizes the National Executive to raise new capital to finance major
and to refinance existing debt.
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floating debt arose because several agencies entered into investment'programs without sufficient cash flow. 49
2. Refinancing and Rationalization
On March 15, 1980, the Government was finally able to determine the approximate size of this floating debt. A study undertaken jointly by a Special Commission appointed by the President and the Directorate of Public Credit of the Ministry of
Finance determined that the floating debt 150 of twelve major Government entities was approximately six billion dollars; 4.5 billion
dollars of this represented short-term external debt of less than
one year. In 1981 legislation was proposed to refinance this shortterm debt by permitting a massive refinancing to stretch out 4.3
million dollars in short-term debt and to permit new borrowings
to underwrite development projects. This legislation is still pending at the time of this writing.
V.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON DOING

BusiNEss

IN VENEZUELA

A. Mixed Attitudes Toward Foreign Investment
Notwithstanding the apparently favorable attitudes toward foreign investment held by the SIEX acting superintendent 51 and
the Finance Minister, observers continue to note strong voices
against foreign investment. Presidents of the Venezuelan Investment Fund and the Venezuelan Foreign Trade Institute have
voiced their opposition toward such foreign presence. 5 Companies considering virgin investment in Venezuela should examine
these facts as well as the more favorable aspects of no exchange
controls and a favorable currency reserve policy.,
B. Lower Risk Forms of "Investment"
As an alternative some firms may wish to consider providing
only technology at the outset, as do the more traditional "services" companies. This option may involve a management con149. See Asheshov, supra note 23.

150. This floating debt is comprised of notes for the financing of working
capital needs, bridge financing, and notes financing budgetary insufficiencies.
151. See Bus. WEEK, supra note 72.

152.

VENEZUELA-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE AND INDUSTRY, ECONOMIC

REPORT 80-12 (Dec. 1980). See also Firms in Venezuela Remain Confused by
Muddled Policies, Bus. LATIN AMERICA, Aug. 27, 1980, at 274-75.
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tract, a technology license, and a technical assistance agreement.
That may include an option to take up to forty-nine percent equity, instead of royalties, thus leaving the firm eventually in a
joint venture after having gained some prior experience.
C.

Fading Out and Fading In

Another important consideration will be whether local firms are
able to raise capital to fade in and acquire the interests which
foreign companies are required to divest under- ANCOM rules.
The viability of ANCOM is questionable at this time, but Venezuelan officials continue to suggest that the rules will remain the
same, even if the game changes. Current debates over methods to
revitalize the economy, while keeping inflation down from recordhigh 1980 levels, suggest that growth rates may not reach projected levels and the VI NDP will consequently have to be scaled
back substantially. Although Venezuela remains an attractive
market for foreign investors in the long term, short-term strategies may require fine tuning to avoid overcapacity and early
losses.

